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Abstract 
We outline an Evolutionary-Embodied-Epistemological (EEE) account of intellectual 
arrogance, proposing that people psychologically experience their important beliefs as valued 
possessions—mental materialism—that they must fight to keep—ideological territoriality— 
thereby disposing them toward intellectual arrogance. Nonetheless, intellectual arrogance 
should still vary, being higher among people taking a hostile and domineering epistemic 
stance (rejecting reality, resisting evidence) than among those taking an open and deferential 
one (embracing reality, respecting evidence). Such variations can be predicted from people’s 
standing on the communion-agency circumplex at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., from their 
social inclusion and status; dispositional warmth and competence; and behavioral amiability 
and assertiveness). Using pre-validated indices of mental materialism and ideological 
territoriality, and an argument evaluation task permitting the quantification of rational 
objectivity and egotistical bias, we obtained consistent correlational evidence that, as 
hypothesized, intellectual arrogance is highest when agency is high and communion low, 
validating the EEE account. (149 words) 
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As Oscar Wilde (1895) once observed, “truth is rarely pure and never simple (p. 10)”. 
One reason is that the world is hard to understand in itself (Blackburn, 2005). But there is 
another reason: human minds can operate in a way that obscures apprehension of reality 
(McGinn, 1993; Wolpert, 2013). Indeed, decades of research document abundantly the 
myriad ways in which human cognition falls short of optimal rationality (Ariely, 2009; 
Gilovich, Griffin, Kahneman, 2002; Nickerson, 1998), even if mental shortcuts may operate 
tolerably well in practice (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Moreover, much evidence points 
to human irrationality being at least partly the product of motivational biases (Gregg, 
Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011; Kunda, 1990; Molden, & Higgins, 2012). People are prone to 
promote and protect their own preferred opinions (Ditto & Lopez, 1992; Edwards & Smith, 
1996; Sedikides & Strube, 1997; Stanovich & West, 2008; Taber, Damon & Simona, 2009). 
Specifically, in evaluating the quality of arguments bearing on some issue, people’s 
prior opinions on that issue sway their evaluations of those arguments, independently of the 
objective quality of those arguments (Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 
1997). Such compromised evaluations may be characterized in terms of their psychological 
(as opposed to philosophical) direction of fit (Gregg & Sedikides, in press; Tenenbaum, 
2006). Not only is this fit mind-to-world—disinterestedly reflecting how things actually are—
but also world-to-mind—prejudicially reflecting how one sees things. Belief is corrupted, 
amongst other things, by the operation of the self-enhancement motive (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2011; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008), resulting in a surfeit of regard for one’s own perspective—
an egotistical bias—combined with a deficiency of regard for reality—a lack of objectivity. 
Such epistemic transgressions can be seen as hallmarks of intellectual arrogance (IA), or as 
counter-indications of intellectual humility (IH). (See Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014, and the 
other contributors to this Special Issue, for additional discussion of these constructs.) To the 
extent that intellectual arrogance prevails over intellectual humility among a community of 
discussants, genuine understanding may be compromised, and practical catastrophes may 
result (Johnson, 2013; Shermer, 2015). Hence, it is important to develop a deeper 
understanding of the nature of intellectual arrogance and humility, including as means of 
predicting their occurrence. 
Evolutionary Accounts 
One approach to these issues is evolutionary (Coyne, 2010; Darwin, 1859). Our 
human nature came to be what it is, at least in part, because it was conducive to the survival 
and reproduction of our ancestors. Accordingly, we can helpfully construe current aspects of 
our mind and behavior in terms of their ultimate function—as adaptations that were 
systematically selected for (Cosmides & Tooby, 2013)—or in terms of their historical 
precursors—as sophisticated elaborations of more primitive substrates (Tallis, 2003). To take 
but one example, self-esteem may have evolved partly to help optimize social competition 
(Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & De Waal-Andrews, 2015; Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, 
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2013; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006) and be rooted in simpler 
judgments of the capacity to hold onto valued resources (Price, Sloman, Gilbert, Gardner, & 
Rohde, 1994; Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). 
Note that, despite the integrative power of the evolutionary framework (Neuberg, 
Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010), not everything about mind and behavior may be fully 
interpretable in terms of genetically-coded biological evolution. In particular, it is unclear 
how exactly the capacity to explicitly recognize and seek truth—which is arguably presumed 
by many definitions of intellectual arrogance and humility—arose (Nagel, 2012; Tallis, 
2011). This unique capacity goes hand in hand with many others, such as expressing oneself 
linguistically (Pinker, 2008), apprehending oneself reflexively (Corballis, 2011), and 
engaging in reflective or propositional thought (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2011; Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004). To this extent, humans may exhibit a type of emancipated cognition (Gregg 
& Mahadevan, 2014) that defies complete naturalistic explanation. 
 Nonetheless, as Wittgenstein (1953) pithily put it, “[t]he human body is the best 
picture of the human soul (p. 178)”. This insight is the basis of the field of embodied 
cognition (Barsalou, 2008). The key proposal here is that abstract or symbolic concepts have 
perceptual or physical roots, often foreshadowed in metaphorical correspondences (Lakoff & 
Johnson, 1980). For example, the vertical dimension of physical space symbolically conveys 
differentials in power—a phenomenon detectable in paradigms where targets are judged more 
readily as powerful to the extent that they occupy visibly higher positions (Schubert, 2005). 
Behaviorally, the bodily act of making a fist also makes men feel more powerful (Schubert & 
Koole, 2009). At the same time, the horizontal dimension of physical space conveys 
symbolically differentials in interpersonal closeness—a phenomenon capitalized on by 
measures that scale intimacy in terms of visual overlaps (Schubert & Otten, 2002). 
Behaviorally, the bodily act of approaching outgroup members also decreases people’s 
implicit dislike of them (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio, 2007). In all these cases, a 
more primitive psychological phenomenon lies behind a more sophisticated one. Moreover, 
the evolutionary roots of the more primitive phenomenon may be easier to discern. Indeed, 
the basis of social cognition may be a set of embodied cognitive modules that specifically 
answer the adaptive problems set by evolution (Kaschak & Maner, 2009).  
In a similar vein, theories have advanced more general accounts of cognition guided 
by evolutionary considerations. For example, human beings’ reasoning capacities may have 
evolved, not to facilitate knowledge acquisition or good decision-making, but rather to 
facilitate practical argumentation—the purpose of which is to persuade peers to do one’s 
bidding, or to screen their communications for trustworthiness (Mercier & Sperber, 2011). 
This theory accounts for, amongst other things, the existence of confirmation bias (which aids 
persuasion) and the superiority of reasoning in the context of dialectical discussion (i.e., its 
natural context). Equally, self-deception may have evolved as an anti-screening strategy: for 
no deception can be detected if one believes one’s own lies (Von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), 
which may explain why the objectively overconfident do receive better peer evaluations 
(Lamba & Nityananda, 2014). Finally, error management theory (Haselton, Nettle, & 
Andrews, 2005) explains many cognitive biases in terms of a natural selection for errors of 
judgment least likely to imperil the organism—those that yield many harmless false alarms 
but few fatal misses. Thus, heterosexual men, but not women, overestimate the opposite sex’s 
erotic interest in them (Hasleton, 2003). 
 The above research illustrates how construing human beings as biologically rooted 
creatures shaped by evolution has yielded some theoretically promising and empirically 
supported accounts of various psychological phenomena. Below, we attempt to do the same 
for intellectual arrogance and humility. 
Mental Materialism and Ideological Territoriality 
Much philosophical ink has been spilled in an attempt to resolve the classic mind-
body problem (Descartes, 1637/1991; McGinn, 1993; Searle, 1992). In brief, it is not clear 
how something ethereal like the mind, with its abstract ideas, can be identical to something 
physical like the brain, with its concrete location. However, we propose here that people 
intuitively bridge the infamous mind-body dichotomy—at least for beliefs central to their 
identity (Gregg et al., 2011). In particular, at a psychological level, people experience their 
important beliefs as valuable possessions that they must fight to keep (Abelson, 1986). More 
formally, people exhibit both mental materialism and ideological territoriality (Gregg & 
Mahadevan, 2014). Mental materialism involves evaluating beliefs more positively because 
they are one’s own, and consequently becoming more attached to those beliefs—much as 
people exhibit an endowment effect, valuing goods that are theirs more than others’, and 
consequently asking for more money to relinquish the former than they offer to acquire the 
latter (Morewedge, Shu, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2009). Ideological territoriality, a natural 
outgrowth of mental materialism, involves a combative approach to argumentation: seeking 
to prevail rhetorically rather than to arrive at the truth, so as to protect or promote one’s own 
existing beliefs—much as people seek to defeat enemies vying for scarce resources, so as to 
maintain or expand control over some geographical area (Edney, 1974). We propose that 
mental materialism and ideological territoriality reflect a default mode of embodied 
cognition, a hangover from our evolutionary heritage, and that they lie at the root of 
intellectual arrogance.  
Mental materialism and ideological territoriality are not, however, inevitable; human 
beings are, in principle, still capable of emancipated cognition—that is, of weighing the 
merits of beliefs from a detached and impartial perspective (mental detachment) and of 
treating argumentation as a cooperative means of getting at the truth (ideological neutrality). 
These relatively cultivated activities—which require logical and methodological discipline 
(e.g., philosophy or science)—lie at the root of intellectual humility (Blackburn, 2005; 
Wolpert, 2013). The embodied-emancipated dichotomy might also be considered yet another 
addition to the pantheon of dual-factor models of cognition (Evans, 2012; Kahneman, 2011). 
Let us call our general account of intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility the 
evolutionary-embodied-epistemic account, or EEE account for short.  
Existing Evidence for the Evolutionary-Embodied-Epistemic Account 
 Three lines of evidence provide initial support for the EEE account. The first is 
circumstantial and involves language. Clusters of linguistic terms metaphorically refer to 
belief in terms of physical objects, and to argumentation in terms of physical conflicts. 
Like physical objects, beliefs can be held. Equally, they can be acquired or discarded, 
picked up, or set aside. As bits of stuff, they may also be shaped or molded over time; for 
having been initially flexible, they can eventually become fixed. Moreover, their close 
cousins— ideas—can be grasped. Like valued possessions, moreover, ideas can be shared or 
traded. However, if someone tries to sell you an idea, you may not buy it; it may be a load of 
nonsense, of which you need to take stock. Moreover, although you may have your beliefs, 
and I may have mine, it is not clear whether either of us is entitled to them. Either way, 
people may become attached to their beliefs. If they find a belief attractive, they may cherish 
it dearly, clinging to it and being loath to give it up. 
Like physical conflicts, moreover, arguments can be won or lost, by people on 
different sides of an issue, who describe themselves as being either for or against some bone 
of contention. In terms of territory, opponents try to attack or defend each other’s positions, 
which are either strong or weak, and which they may be inclined to advance or retreat from, 
because the grounds for maintaining them can be relatively solid or shaky. Indeed, 
argumentation itself is weaponized, with each side striving to make incisive points that cannot 
be parried, not matter how much their opponents seek to deflect or dodge them. Ultimately, 
the rival claims that are disputed need to be supported or shored up, lest they be undermined 
or demolished. 
A second line of evidence for the EEE account is that several studies have already 
demonstrated a causal connection between physical and psychological construals. For 
example, people who are made to hold heavier objects regard the issues under consideration 
as more important (i.e., “weightier”) and think more carefully about them (Jostmann, Lakens, 
& Schubert, 2009). In addition, when people commit their beliefs to paper, those beliefs 
feature more strongly in their subsequent judgments when that paper is preserved (by being 
stored in their pockets) than when that paper is destroyed (by being torn up and discarded) 
(Brinol, Casdcol, Petty, & Horcajo, 2012). Finally, both affirming the self (by listing an 
important value), and threatening the self (by having participants summarize a very difficult 
passage), affect the prices that sellers and buyers initially announce they would prefer to trade 
a physical good at. The standard finding is that sellers, who own the product, announce a 
higher price than buyers, who intend to own it; yet affirming the self increases this price 
discrepancy whereas threatening the self reduces it, suggesting a communality between 
monetary and psychological currency (Chatterjee, Irmak, & Rose, 2013). 
 Gregg, Mahadevan, and Sedikides (in press) provided a third line of experimental 
evidence favouring the EEE account. Participants considered a hypothetical theory about two 
arbitrarily named alien species on a faraway planet. The theory stated that one species was 
the predator and the other its prey. Participants read, one by one, seven pieces of evidence 
bearing on this theory, each time estimating its likely truth or falsity on a sliding scale 
ranging from 100 (certain to be true) to 0 (certain to be false). The evidence initially 
supported the theory, but then cast doubt on it. Across different studies, the theory was subtly 
ascribed either to the participant themselves (“You have a theory”), to another person (“Alex 
has a theory”), or to no one at all (“There is a theory”). People estimated the theory to be 
more likely to be true when it was “theirs”. This effect is consistent both with people being 
disposed to regard their own theories as superior (i.e., as true) and with being reluctant to 
abandon them, that is, with mental materialism. 
Expanding and Testing the Evolutionary-Embodied-Epistemic Account 
 The EEE account can be expanded to make further testable predictions. This can be 
done by invoking, on the one hand, additional considerations of embodiment, and, on the 
other hand, a key integrative model in psychology. 
In principle, what traits would define someone high in intellectual humility—one 
striving for objectivity, whose epistemic orientation is mind-to-world? Arguably two: she 
should welcome and embrace reality, in a spirit of openness; and she should follow the 
arguments and respect the evidence, in a spirit of deference. Indeed, reflective rationality can 
be defined as a self-imposed duty to constrain one’s beliefs, and delusion as a failure to do so 
(Gregg, 2009). In embodied terms, someone high in intellectual humility would be drawing 
closer to some higher reality, and obligingly letting it impose its imprint upon her.  
Conversely, what traits in principle would define someone high in IA, one 
succumbing to egotistical bias, whose epistemic orientation is world-to-mind? Arguably two: 
he should ignore and reject reality, in a spirit of hostility; and he should resist arguments and 
refuse to bow to evidence, in a spirit of dominance. In embodied terms, he would be looking 
down on some uncongenial reality, and seeking stubbornly to impose his preferences on it. 
These contrasting epistemic stances (hostile + dominant vs. open + deferential) can 
also be efficiently characterized in embodied terms—as being either against and above the 
world or towards and below the world (Figure 1). Note too how the two dimensions 
described have echoes in the embodiment literature (e.g., openness-hostility = closeness: 
Schubert & Otten, 2002; dominance-deference = hierarchy: Schubert, 2005). 
Now, someone high in intellectual arrogance is arguably liable to exhibit more mental 
materialism and ideological territoriality than someone high in intellectual humility. In 
particular, the more one values and is attached to one’s own beliefs, the less open one is to 
abiding by the indications of some contrary reality; and adopting a combative approach to 
argumentation is one way to express a hostile and domineering attitude. In support of this 
view, other theorizing and research has characterized variations in intellectual humility and 
normative rationality in terms of each of the two dimensions above. The openness-hostility 
dimension arguably maps on to individual differences in open-mindedness versus closed-
mindedness (Kruglanski, 2013)—which has been linked to intellectual humility both 
theoretically (Speigel, 2012) and empirically (Ottati, Wilson, & Price, 2015). The deference-
dominance dimension—which is theoretically linked to intellectual humility when 
characterized as a conspicuous lack of concern with status (Roberts & Wood, 2003) and low 
self-exaltation (Cleveland, 2015)—maps on to individual differences in social dominance 
orientation as a source of prejudice (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and social vigilantism (i.e., the 
“tendency of individuals to impress and propagate their superior beliefs”) as a source of 
resistance to persuasion (Saucier & Webster, 2010, p. 19).  
Thus, although mental materialism and ideological territoriality may be built-in 
psychological proclivities, they also admit of variation that can be characterized along both 
an openness-hostility dimension and a dominance-deference dimension. How might such 
variation be predicted? 
 Both dimensions can be arranged in terms of the circumplex—a general model that 
features a pair of orthogonal super-dimensions characterizing a diversity of psychological 
phenomena (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Bakan, 1966; Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Foa, 
1961; Huo, Binning, & Molina, 2010; McCrae & Costa, 1989; Moskowitz, 1994; Paulhus & 
John, 1998; Wiggins, 1979). These are communion and agency. Broadly speaking, they have 
to do, respectively, with relating to others and acting in the world. At different levels of 
analysis, moreover, they take different forms. At a social level, they manifest as inclusion and 
status; at a dispositional level, as warmth and competence; and at a behavioral level, as 
amiability and assertiveness (Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & DeWaal-Andrews, 2015). At 
each of these levels, a pattern of lower communion and higher agency should predict an 
epistemic stance that is against and above the world (i.e., high in intellectual arrogance), 
whereas a pattern of higher communion and lower agency should predict an epistemic stance 
that is towards and below the world (i.e., low in intellectual arrogance). In particular, people 
who are (a) low in inclusion but high in status, (b) low in warmth but high in competence, 
and (c) low in amiability but high in assertiveness, should exhibit greater intellectual 
arrogance, whereas people with a diametrically opposed standing should exhibit less 
intellectual arrogance (Figure 2). That is, people’s social position, their personality 
disposition, and their behavioral inclination should facilitate the adoption of a hostile (as 
opposed to open) and domineering (as opposed to obliging) orientation that gets carried over 
into their epistemic stance towards the world.  
To summarize: Human cognition is partly embodied. People have a default inclination 
to manifest mental materialism and ideological territoriality—that is, to treat their important 
beliefs as valuable possessions that they must fight to keep. This default inclination is a form 
of intellectual arrogance (as opposed to intellectual humility) and commonly manifests itself 
as an egotistical bias or a lack of objectivity. However, intellectual arrogance, so 
characterized, can also vary. Specifically, to the extent that people adopt an epistemic stance 
that is, in embodied terms, against and above world (i.e., more hostile than open, and more 
domineering than deferential), their intellectual arrogance will be higher. This epistemic 
stance can predicted, moreover, from high levels of agency and lower levels of communion, 
at multiple levels of analysis. 
Quantifying Variations in Intellectual Arrogance and Humility 
To test our predictions empirically, we employed a complementary pair of indices of 
intellectual arrogance/humility. The first index was a bespoke self-report inventory designed 
to assess individual differences in both mental materialism and ideological territoriality. 
Entitled the Brief Intellectual Arrogance Scale (BIAS), its purpose was to operationalize the 
constructs directly referenced in EEE theory themselves. The second index was a new version 
of a prior instrument (Stanovich & West, 1997), and was here used to operationalize a 
principal cognitive manifestation of intellectual arrogance/humility. Entitled Gregg’s Revised 
Evaluation of Arguments Task (GREAT), its purpose was to quantify the extent to which 
people’s evaluations, of the quality of arguments bearing on various issues, reflected either 
(a) the independently determined quality of those arguments (indicating rational objectivity), 
or (b) their own prior opinions on those issues (indicating egotistical bias). Importantly, both 
our indices of intellectual arrogance/humility had undergone prior validation (further details 
below). 
Quantifying Variations in Agency and Communion 
As in Mahadevan et al. (2015), we operationalized communion and agency at three 
levels: socially, as inclusion and status; dispositionally, as warmth and competence; and 
behaviorally, as amiability and assertiveness. In all cases, we relied on respondents’ self-
reports, using scales and items derived from previous research (further details below).  
Design, Analysis, and Predictions 
In a cross-sectional design, we sought to determine whether the pattern of relations 
that emerged between operationalizations of agency and communion, on the one hand, and 
BIAS and GREAT indices, on the one other, would be consistent with our expanded EEE 
account. 
 Our statistical strategy to uncover such relations was as follows. Each time, we 
regressed relevant scores reflecting intellectual arrogance/humility—from the BIAS and the 
GREAT—on a pair of predictors, with each pair corresponding to agency and communion at 
one of the three levels of analysis (i.e., social, dispositional, behavioral). We did this because, 
although the respective dimensions of the circumplex at each level are conceptually distinct, 
they can sometimes be empirically correlated, creating the need for mutual statistical control.1 
In line with our extended EEE account, we predicted the emergence, in each of these multiple 
regressions, of (a) a negative beta weight for the communal variable (i.e., lower IA), and (b) a 
positive beta weight for the agentic variable (i.e., higher IA). The combination of these two 
beta weights would figuratively place higher intellectual arrogance in the upper left quadrant 
of the circumplex, and lower intellectual arrogance in the bottom right quadrant.  
For completeness, we also included, in each of these regressions, an additional 
predictor representing a multiplicative combination of both predictors. This permitted us to 
test for the possibility of a synergic interaction emerging that would also be consistent with 
our extended EEE account, such that lower agency and higher communion scores together 
predicted higher intellectual arrogance (or lower intellectual humility), above and beyond 
their individual additive contributions.  
Method 
Platform and Procedure 
We ran the study online, as part of a larger survey lasting about an hour. We created 
its content using the internet survey software iSurvey (University of Southampton, 2015). We 
crowdsourced participants via the leading platform CrowdFlower. They signed up voluntarily 
in exchange for payment of $3.00. We targeted Western and English-speaking participants 
using interface options. Before beginning, all participants viewed an information sheet. 
Thereafter, they indicated their consent by clicking a box. Finally, after completing the 
survey—mostly by clicking radio buttons on assorted questionnaires—they viewed a 
debriefing statement. 
Crowdsourcing provides reliably an abundance of valid data, both rapidly and 
cheaply, from diverse participants (Buhrmeister, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Paolacci & 
Chandler, 2014). Nonetheless, out of prudence, we still excluded cases that featured (a) 
skipping of survey content (i.e., fewer than 95% of items completed); (b) identical responses 
to any questionnaire with reversed-score items (suggesting mindless button-clicking); (c) 
duplicate IP addresses (suggesting multiple completions); (d) suspiciously short durations 
(i.e., in less than half the median survey time); (e) poor self-reported English proficiency; and 
(f) a self-reported age below 18 years. Our final sample contained 722 participants.2 These 
were mostly female (61.1%), mostly young (MAGE = 36.0; SDAGE = 11.7), mostly North 
American or British (USA: 47.5%; UK: 26.6%; Canada: 18.4%; Others: 7.5%), and generally 
well educated (53.8% with a college degree, 99.7% with a high school or equivalent 
diploma). 
Indices of Communion and Agency 
 Inclusion and Status. We assessed communion and agency at a social level—one’s 
inclusion and status as accorded by peers—using 9-item (α = .93) and 8-item (α = .91) self-
report scales, respectively. Both scales were based on those devised by Huo et al. (2010), but 
included new items and excluded existing items so as to streamline conceptual coverage, and 
to optimize a two-factor solution (Mahadevan, Gregg, & Sedikides, in press). Both scales 
featured a 5-point response format (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). All items 
began with the same sentence stem (“Most of the time, I feel that people…”) and ended with 
a different sentence completion. Sample items: “see me as fitting in” (inclusion); “see me as 
an important person” (status). 
 Warmth and Competence. We assessed communion and agency at a dispositional 
level—one’s warmth and competence as self-ascribed—using two 7-items self-report scales 
(with α = .89, and α = .84, respectively). We selected adjectives a priori from stimuli used in 
previous research on communal and agentic personality traits (Campbell, Rudich, & 
Sedikides, 2002). Both scales featured a 7-point response format (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). All items began with the same sentence stem (“On the whole, I see myself 
as…”) and ended with a different trait adjective. Items list: caring, helpful, supportive, 
friendly, kind, gentle, nice (warmth); competent, effective, strong, powerful, capable, 
intelligent, talented (competence).  
These scales being newly formulated, we also conducted an exploratory factor 
analysis of all items together, using Principal Axis Factoring with a Direct Oblimin rotation. 
This revealed two factors, correlated at r =.43, with eigenvalues above 1, together accounting 
for 56% of the variance. Validating the intended structure, the pattern matrix items loaded on 
matching factors with a minimum value of .50, and on mismatching factors with a maximum 
value of .15. 
 Amiability and Assertiveness. We assessed communion and agency at a behavioral 
level—one’s amiability and assertiveness as displayed in an interpersonal context—level 
using a 32-item self-report inventory, the International Personality Item Pool–Interpersonal 
Circumplex (IPIP-IPC; Markey & Markey, 2009), which has underdone prior validation 
(Markey, Anderson, & Markey, 2013). Its items were devised, not merely to divide the 
circumplex for interpersonal behavior into quadrants—via the double-bisection of the two 
main orthogonal dimensions—but additionally to divide it into octants, such that half its 
items assess blends of the two main dimensions, figuratively lying at 45 degree angles from 
each vertex (Wiggins, 1979). Nonetheless, by appropriate multiplicative weighting (i.e., main 
dimensions by +/- 1; blended dimensions by +/- Sin 45°), we computed total scores 
corresponding to overall amiability and assertiveness.3  Moreover, to compute internal 
consistency, we divided the 32 items into parallel halves of 16, and computed parallel 
amiability and assertiveness totals, whose intercorrelations we then adjusted upwards in line 
with the Spearman-Brown prophecy formula (Eisinga, Te Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013), 
yielding values of rADJ = .86 and rADJ = .89. 
Indices of Intellectual Arrogance and Humility 
BIAS. We assessed our two proposed elementary constituents of IA—namely, mental 
materialism and ideological territoriality—at a dispositional level, using two corresponding 
6-item self-report scales (with α = .70, and α = .80, respectively). Items from both scales—all 
of which took 7-point bipolar form, and featured contrasting terminal statements—were 
devised a priori to map on to their respective constructs. In particular, items on the mental 
materialism scale were designed to capture egotistically inflated evaluations of one’s own 
beliefs (e.g., my personal ideas are very valuable as they are versus my personal ideas still 
have room for improvement) and undue attachment to one’s own beliefs (e.g., right or wrong, 
I am entitled to hold my beliefs versus I should probably abandon many of the beliefs I hold). 
Items on the ideological territoriality scale were designed to capture a combative approach to 
argumentation (e.g., the only point of a debate is to arrive at the truth versus I enjoy defeating 
weaker opponents in debates) and a tendency to want one’s beliefs to prevail (e.g., I would 
like to see my own opinions becoming widely shared versus I doesn’t bother me that many 
people see things differently to me).  
A series of studies (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Pegler, 2015a) has yielded support for the 
construct validity of the BIAS. Crucially, both the mental materialism and ideological 
territoriality subscales correlated positively with a standard measure of materialistic desire for 
physical goods (Richins & Dawson, 1992), as well as a standard measure of physical 
aggression (Buss & Perry, 1992). In addition, both correlated positively with social 
vigilantism (Saucier & Webster, 2010), with reactance proneness (Shen & Dillard, 2005), as 
well as with psychological variables that promote cognitive bias, such as dogmatic and 
categorical thinking (Stanovich & West, 1997). Thus, both the BIAS subscales fit neatly into 
the nearby nomological web. 
GREAT. We assessed a principal cognitive manifestation of intellectual arrogance 
using GREAT, a completely updated version of the Argument Evaluation Test (AET; Sá, 
West, & Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997). The purpose was the same: to estimate 
the extent to which participants’ evaluations of a set of arguments is objectively rational, 
reflected in the degree of correspondence with normative evaluations of those arguments, or 
egotistically biased, reflected in the degree of correspondence with personal opinions related 
to those arguments. This task ran as follows. Participants began by indicating, on 7-point 
scales, their level of agreement or disagreement (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 
with a set of statements expressing a variety of controversial political opinions (e.g., Every 
worker should be legally guaranteed a minimum wage whatever job they do; Ordinary 
civilians should be legally permitted to own a standard firearm for personal use). Next, they 
re-read every statement, now supplemented by series of three additional statements: an 
argument for it; a counterargument against that argument; and a rebuttal to that 
counterargument. In each case, participants then judged “how weak or strong […] the rebuttal 
[…] is, while ignoring [their] own opinion” (1 = extremely weak, 7 = extremely strong). 
Subsequently, the mean ratings of the quality of the rebuttals were computed to estimate the 
normative quality of those arguments (Surowiecki, 2004).  
On the basis of these three sets of ratings— individual prior opinions, individual 
argument evaluations, and normative argument evaluations—we computed a multiple 
regression for each participant (Figure 3). We used the beta weight corresponding to the 
prediction of individual argument evaluations from individual prior opinions in order to 
operationalize each participant’s level of egocentric bias; and we used the beta weight 
corresponding to the prediction of individual argument evaluations from normative argument 
evaluations (constant across participants) in order to operationalize each participant’s level of 
rational objectivity (Stanovich & West, 1997). Thus, we derived separate estimates for 
egocentric bias and rationality objectivity. The statistical control afforded by such beta 
weights makes them more specific indices than raw correlational coefficients would be.4 We 
also took care to exclude any anomalous beta weights in excess of .99, which 
multicollinearity occasionally produced.  
The content of GREAT, whose content was entirely novel, had been designed to be 
briefer, more standardized, more ideologically balanced, and more internationally accessible 
than the original AET. First, unlike the original AET, whose statements and arguments 
contained up to 49 words, and varied greatly in length, no statement or argument in the 
GREAT contained more than 16 words, and most were nearly that long. In addition, whereas 
the AET repeated instructions with every item, the GREAT supplied them up front. Second, 
the GREAT, unlike the AET, did not require the participants to assume that any supplemental 
facts were true, or that any people were uttering them: arguments alone were presented. 
Third, in the GREAT, we designed half the statements to express left-wing points of view, 
and half right-wing ones; in contrast, political content in the AET was not balanced. Finally, 
whereas several items in the AET related specifically to US issues (e.g., Interviews should be 
given a higher weighting in graduate school admissions than GREs or undergraduate GPAs), 
items in the GREAT were relevant to developed nations generally (e.g., When the economy is 
in a slump, the government should spend money to get it going). In addition, the GREAT 
featured 24 items and 7-point scale, as opposed to the AET’s 23 items and 4-point scale. 
Several studies (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Pegler, 2015b) found support for the construct 
validity of the GREAT. First, in two samples, we asked participants to indicate additionally 
the extent to which they identified with each underlying issue on the GREAT, expressed as a 
label (e.g., Minimum Wage, Gun Control) on a three-point scale (1 = I don’t identify with this 
issue at all: it hardly matters to me, 2 = I somewhat identify with this issue: it somewhat 
matters to me, 3 = I strongly identify with this issue: it really matters to me). We then 
computed separate aggregate indices of egotistical bias and rational objectivity based on 
issues idiosyncratically selected to be at each level of identification. In both samples, we 
obtained a predicted interaction: whereas aggregate levels of egotistical bias rose when 
computed on the basis of topics that mattered more rather than less to participants, aggregate 
levels of objectivity fell. Thus, identification promoted bias, where indifference promoted 
objectivity. These findings—which constitute a type of internal validation of the GREAT— 
replicate many others showing that self-enhancement biases are greater when the topic at 
hand is more central rather than more peripheral to people’s identity (Gebauer, Wagner, 
Sedikides, & Neberich, 2013; Gregg et al., 2011; Sedikides & Green, 2009). 
We also obtained some additional evidence of the GREAT’s construct validity from 
external correlations. In particular, the rational objectivity coefficient—incidentally, the only 
one reported by Stanovich and West (1997)—correlated positively with openness to 
experience (Benet-Martinez, & John, 1998) and with flexible thinking (Stanovich & West, 
1997), but correlated negatively with the overclaiming bias (i.e., claimed recognition of 
fictitious relative to real words; cf. Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2003) and with 
questionnaire items assessing the self-deceptive enhancement of one’s intellectual abilities 
(Paulhus, 1998). However, no such pattern of confirmatory correlations emerged for the 
egotistical bias coefficient. 
Results and Discussion 
Preliminary Analyses 
  
Table 1 displays intercorrelations between the dependent variables, designed to 
capture intellectual arrogance/humility, namely, the mental materialism and ideological 
territoriality indices of the BIAS, and egotistical bias and rational objectivity indices of the 
GREAT. Table 2 displays intercorrelations between the independent variables designed to 
capture communion and agency at different levels: inclusion and status (social); warmth and 
competence (dispositional); and amiability and assertiveness (behavioral).  
As would be expected, the mental materialism and ideological territoriality indices 
intercorrelated positively, consistent with the former being the hypothesized source of the 
latter. Also as expected, the egotistical bias and rational objectivity indices correlated 
negatively, consistent with both tending to exclude one another. Furthermore, as would be 
expected if both the BIAS and GREAT converged in assessing intellectual 
arrogance/humility (and despite the pronounced methodological dissimilarity of the 
instruments), their indices intercorrelated. Specifically, greater mental materialism and 
ideological territoriality both correlated negatively with rational objectivity. In other words, 
the more participants professed to valuing and being attached to their beliefs, or to taking a 
combative approach to arguments and wanting their beliefs to prevail, the less their individual 
evaluations of arguments were predicted by “correct” normative evaluations of those 
arguments, independently of their own opinions on argument-related topics. All else equal, 
then, this empirical convergence adds to the construct validity of both instruments. However, 
contrary to expectation, neither mental materialism nor ideological territoriality correlated 
significantly with egotistical bias. These null results, however, were in keeping with the 
absence of correlations between egotistical bias and other constructs during earlier validation 
(Gregg et al., 2015b), as well as the absence of any reports of such correlations by Stanovich 
and West (1997). 
The various indices of agency and communion also exhibited a mostly positive 
manifold, with one or two minor exceptions. Moreover, though the coefficients were large 
enough to suggest affinities, they did not indicate redundancies. Correlations at different 
levels between matched variables (i.e., both communion or both agency: regular font in Table 
2) generally exceeded those between mismatched variables (i.e., one communion and the 
other agency: italic font in Table 2). In addition, correlations between the agentic and 
communal variables at the same level of analysis (e.g., status and inclusion: bold font in 
Table 2; also see Footnote) were almost identical to those observed by Mahadevan et al. 
(2015). Thus, at least at social and dispositional levels of analysis, some mutual control 
between was warranted between the overlapping communal and agentic variables used to 
predict levels of intellectual arrogance/humility. 
Main Analyses 
We used the communal and agentic variables at each level of analysis, plus their 
derived interaction term, to separately predict each of our four indices of intellectual 
arrogance/humility, following the hierarchical multiple regression procedures recommended 
by Aiken and West (1991)—in particular, centering all the predictors, and entering the 
interaction terms last. Table 3 displays the corresponding beta weights and their significance. 
For three of our indices of intellectual arrogance/humility, findings were entirely in accord 
with our hypotheses: significant betas for the agentic variable and the communal variable 
emerged in the right direction. As regards the GREAT, the higher people’s inclusion, 
warmth, and amiability, the more their individual evaluations of arguments were predicted by 
“correct” normative evaluations of those arguments (i.e., they more they exhibited rational 
objectivity); furthermore, the higher their status, competence, and assertiveness, the less this 
was the case. As regard the BIAS, the higher people’s status, competence, and assertiveness, 
the higher their mental materialism and ideological territoriality scores were; furthermore, the 
higher the inclusion, warmth, and amiability, the lower those scores were. In other words, 
two main effects emerged across also levels of analysis, such that higher agency and lower 
communion independently predicted higher levels of intellectual arrogance. Accordingly, our 
data suggest that intellectual arrogance “belongs” in the top left corner of the circumplex, and 
intellectual humility in the bottom right (Figure 2). In addition, inspection reveals a further 
pattern in our data. For rational objectivity, links to agency and communion variables were 
comparable; for mental materialism, links to agency were relatively larger; and, for 
ideological territoriality, links to communion were relatively larger. Thus, agency may 
characterize better the more intrapsychic nature of mental materialism, whereas communion 
may characterize better the more interpersonal nature of ideological territoriality. 
Only one statistical interaction emerged (for assertiveness x amiability predicting 
ideological territoriality), but this just reached significance and so may be artifactual. 
However, we found no link between egotistical bias on the GREAT and any of the predictor 
variables. This flush of null effects again echoes previous findings. 
General Discussion 
The philosopher Bertrand Russell (1950) once ruefully remarked that “[m]an is a 
rational animal—so at least I have been told […] I have looked diligently for evidence in 
favour of this statement, but so far I have not had the good fortune to come across it […] (p. 
82)”. He went on to catalogue an array of “intellectual rubbish” that often translated into evil 
and tragedy. One primary source of man not being a rational animal, in this consequential 
way, is intellectual arrogance: people prefer, under the influence of the self-enhancement 
motive, to cleave to opinions at variance with argument and evidence (Alicke & Sedikides, 
2009; Kunda, 1990; Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Accordingly, it is important to understand the 
nature and precursors of intellectual arrogance to help cultivate the countervailing virtue of 
intellectual humility. 
Here, we took an approach that considers people’s epistemic biases to be partly the 
result of human beings being embodied creatures whose ancestors were subject to 
evolutionary selection (Haselton, Nettle, & Andrews, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Mercier 
& Sperber, 2011). Our evolutionary-embodied-epistemic (EEE) account (see also Gregg and 
Mahadevan, 2014) proposes that people psychologically experience their beliefs as valuable 
possessions that they must fight to keep. In particular, people exhibit both mental 
materialism—overvaluing their beliefs and becoming attached to them—and ideological 
territoriality—taking a combative approach to argumentation and wanting their beliefs to 
prevail generally. As fundamental features of embodied cognition (Barsalou, 2008), both 
mental materialism and ideological territoriality naturally tend to promote intellectual 
arrogance. In contrast, the emancipated cognition of which human beings also capable, 
involving mental detachment and ideological neutrality, needs to be carefully cultivated. 
 Circumstantial evidence from linguistic metaphors (Abelson, 1986), and 
experimental research (Chatterjee et al., 2013; Gregg, Mahadevan, & Sedikides, in press), 
supports the EEE account. Here, expanding that account, we postulated that individual 
differences in people’s tendencies to adopt different epistemic stances towards the world 
would vary the degree to which they exhibited intellectual arrogance versus humility. In 
particular, we postulated that people could adopt an embodied stance that was against and 
above the world, characterized by the hostile rejection of reality and attempts to dominate 
recalcitrant data, or towards and below the world, characterized by the open embracing of 
reality and due respect for reason and evidence (Figure 1). Moreover, we postulated that these 
contrasting stances could be characterized in terms of the communion-agency circumplex 
(Figure 2), extensively used to organize many psychology phenomena at different levels of 
analysis (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Bakan, 1966; Mahadevan, Gregg, Sedikides, & De 
Waal-Andrews, 2015). In particular, we hypothesized that intellectual arrogance would be 
higher to the extent that levels of agency were higher and levels of communion lower. 
To test these hypotheses, we used two indices of intellectual arrogance/humility. The 
first was the Brief Intellectual Arrogance Scale (BIAS), comprising twin self-report measures 
of mental materialism and ideological territoriality. The second was Gregg’s Revised 
Evaluation of Arguments Task (GREAT), yielding separate indices of egotistical bias and 
rational objectivity, in the evaluation of arguments bearing on controversial issues. Both 
indices had undergone prior validation (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Pegler, 2015a,b). In addition, 
we used a set of prior measures of agency and communion at three different levels of 
analysis: social, dispositional, and behavioral (Mahadevan et al., 2015). 
In general—but excepting our index of egotistical bias—we observed patterns of 
correlation precisely in accord with the expended EEE account. First, the measures of mental 
materialism and ideological territoriality both correlated with the rational objectivity index, in 
keeping with the contention that both reflect levels of intellectual arrogance/humility. 
Second, the measures of both mental materialism and ideological territoriality, as well as the 
rational objectivity index, related positively to communion but negatively to agency, at all 
levels of analysis. That is, the highest levels of intellectual arrogance were apparent among 
those participants who (a) believed they enjoyed high status among their peers, saw 
themselves as generally competent, and reported behaving in an assertive manner, but who 
simultaneously (b) believed that they did not fit in with their peers, did not see themselves as 
generally warm, and reported not behaving in an amiable manner. These participants reported 
(a) overvaluing their beliefs and becoming attached to them, (b) taking a combative approach 
to argumentation and wanting their beliefs to prevail generally, and (c) evaluating arguments 
differently from the “correct” normative evaluations of those arguments, independently of 
their own opinions on argument-related topics. Thus, people’s capacity or proclivity to adopt 
a stance of being “against and above” others—in terms of their social position, dispositional 
self-view, or behavioral orientation—also seem to adopt a matching epistemic stance—
characterized by more mental materialism, greater ideological territoriality, and non-objective 
argument evaluation. 
Limitations and Qualifications 
 One limitation of the present research was its cross-sectional character. We did not 
establish that variations in agency and communion at various levels of analyses were causally 
responsible for variations in mental materialism, ideological territoriality, and rational 
objectivity. Demonstrating this would require an experimental design—manipulating the 
former dimensions, as independent variables, and observing the result on the latter indices, as 
dependent variables. Nonetheless, the correlational patterns we obtained for these variables 
were precisely consistent with our theoretical hypotheses, which implied a specific joint 
prediction in involving directional effects for a pair of variables. 
 Moreover, one of the GREAT’s indices—egotistical bias—yielded null effects, 
having earlier failed (unlike rational objectivity) to correlate with the measures of mental 
materialism and ideological territoriality. This is surprising, given that a bias towards 
evaluating arguments as being of higher quality to the extent that they match one’s prior 
beliefs (independently of the normative quality of those arguments) would a priori seem to 
operationalize intellectual arrogance rather well. The interpretation of this anomalous null 
effect is complicated by the fact that other research has furnished contradictory signs as to the 
validity of the index. On the one hand, it routinely fails to correlate with a range of relevant 
variables (Gregg, Mahadevan, & Pegler, 2015b); or else researchers only discuss correlates of 
the rational objectivity index (Sá et al., 1999; Stanovich & West, 1997). On the other hand, 
the egotistical bias index in this research does correlate inversely with the rational objectivity 
index, as would be expected; and in two samples, levels of egotistical bias duly increased as 
the rated importance of the topic increased instead—a clear sign of self-enhancement (Gregg, 
Mahadevan, & Pegler, 2015b). Accordingly, it is difficult to put down these null effects 
simply to improper measurement, especially given that the rational objectivity index, which 
was based on identical regression data, yielded such consistent correlations. Yet it is also 
difficult to explain why the egotistical bias would show signs of validity internally but none 
externally. 
Finally, our circumplex-based predictions were exceedingly broad. They concerned 
the adoption of agency-based and communion-based stances on the whole, and how that 
would influence one’s epistemic approach to reality as a whole. As such, the predictions did 
not differentiate between specific situations or contexts, or between specific topics or targets. 
Yet, it is difficult to argue that the adoption of an open and deferential stance when engaged 
in inquiry is always appropriate—that it is the invariant hallmark of epistemic virtue. In 
particular, if a discussant argues for position that all reason and logic indicates is farfetched, 
or that violates bedrock moral scruples (e.g., chemotherapy causes cancer; children may be 
murdered), then responding in an “intellectually arrogant” way seems appropriate. That is, 
the adoption of a hostile and domineering stance—representing a disdainful and steadfast 
rejection of offensive nonsense—can be virtuous (Fumerton, 2010), and indicate a fidelity to 
the truth, rather than an aversion to it. It may be precisely those who are situationally, 
dispositionally, or behaviorally higher in agency and lower in communion who help to keep a 
community of inquirers safe from lapsing into absurdity or falling victim to humbug. 
Coda 
The philosopher Blaise Pascal (1958/1670) opined that “man is a reed [...] but he is a 
thinking reed (p. 97)”. This phrase neatly captures the paradoxical nature of being human—
somehow a part of nature, yet somehow apart from it. But even thinking itself may betray the 
“indelible stamp of [its] lowly origins (p. 597)” (Darwin, 1871). Specifically, people may 
experience their important beliefs in partly physical terms—as valued possessions that they 
must fight to keep. Moreover, people who are generally inclined to adopt domineering and 
inhospitable stance towards the world may be particularly inclined to experience their beliefs 
in this way. Such embodied tendencies, we have shown here, go together with signs of 
intellectual arrogance. The belligerent beast, jealously guarding his sustenance or territory, 
may not be so different from the hubristic human, eagerly defending his beliefs or ideology. 
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Footnotes 
1For example, Mahadevan et al. (2015) found correlations between inclusion and 
status of r ≈ .65, between warmth and competence of r ≈.37, and between amiability and 
assertiveness of r ≈ -.05. 
2Due to logistical constraints in payment disbursement, we were obliged to run the 
same study multiple times in sequence. Due to the unexpected smallness of the online 
sampling pool, many more participants took part on more than one occasion than we 
anticipated. Among the participants making serious attempts at the survey (> 95% of the 
items), the rate of IP duplication was high (35%). In addition, quite a few participants (26%) 
answered identically all items on at least one questionnaire that contained both forward-
scored and reversed-scored item. The remaining screening criteria removed comparatively 
fewer participants (< 5%). Overall, we retained 47% of the original 1540 participants. 
3Note that our labelling of the dimensions for interpersonal behavior differs from prior 
authors. We chose our labels to avoid potential confusion about levels of analysis. For 
example, the term dominance, although used to described interpersonal behaviors (Markey & 
Markey, 2009; Wiggins, 1979, has also been used loosely to signify status or rank (Barkow, 
1980; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).  
4Almost identical results were obtained when alternative coefficients (e.g., semi-
partial correlations) were used. We thus follow Stanovich and West (1997)’s approach for the 
sake of consistency. 
  
Table 1 
Correlations Between Indices of Intellectual Arrogance /Intellectual Humility 
 
 
Mental 
Materialism 
(BIAS) 
Ideological 
Territoriality 
(BIAS) 
Egotistical Bias 
(GREAT) 
  
  
Mental Materialism  
(BIAS) 
-
 
 
 
Ideological Territoriality
  
(BIAS) 
     .56*** -  
Egotistical Bias
  
(GREAT) 
-.01 -.01 - 
Rational Objectivity
 
(GREAT) 
 -.13*   -.14** -.26*** 
 
 
Note. N = 708-716. Mental Materialism and Ideological Territoriality are subscales of the 
Brief Intellectual Arrogance Scales (BIAS). The Egotistical Bias
 
and Rational Objectivity are 
indices are yielded by Gregg’s Revised Evaluation of Arguments Task (GREAT). Both 
indices are derived from simultaneous linear regressions computed individually for each 
participant, in which individual argument evaluations were regressed on individual prior 
opinions (yielding a β for Egotistical Bias) and normative argument evaluations (yielding a β 
for Rational Objectivity). The normative argument evaluations were averages of individual 
argument evaluations across the entire sample, and were constant for each individual. 
*p < .001. **p < .0005. ***p < .0001. 
  
Table 2 
Correlations Between Indices of Communion and Agency at Different Levels of Analysis 
 
 
Inclusion Status Warmth Competence Assertiveness 
  
  
  
  
Inclusion -     
Status    .68*** -    
 
 
  
  
Warmth    .54***    .37*** -   
Competence    .49***    .68***    .40*** -  
   
 
  
Amiability    .55***    .34***    .61*** .24*** - 
Assertiveness  .09*    .23***  -.14** .21*** .03 
 
 
Note. N = 717-719. Inclusion and status reflected communion and agency at a social level 
(ratings of self in the eyes of others). Warmth and competence reflected communion and 
agency at a social level (ratings of self on personality traits). Amiability and assertiveness 
reflected communion and agency at a behavioral level (ratings of typical behaviors for the 
self). Coefficients in bold represent intercorrelations between communion and agency 
variables at the same level of analysis. Coefficients in regular font represent intercorrelations 
between matched variables (i.e., both status, both communion) at different levels of analysis. 
Coefficients in italic font represent intercorrelations between mismatched variables (i.e., one 
status, the other communion) at different levels of analysis. 
*p < .05. **p < .001. ***p < .0001. 
 
 
 
  
Table 3 
Standardized Weights (Betas) from the Regression of Indices of Intellectual Arrogance / 
Intellectual Humility on Two Indices of Communion and Agency, and their Interaction, at 
Different Levels of Analysis 
 
 
mental 
materialism 
β 
ideological 
territoriality 
β 
Egotistical Bias 
β 
Rational Objectivity 
β 
  
  
  
 
Inclusion    -.18***     -.32***  .05   .12** 
Status     .34***      .24*** -.07   -.18*** 
Inclusion x Status .05 .06  .04 .02 
  
  
 
Warmth  -.09*     -.17***  .01  .08* 
Competence     .37***     .11** -.05 -.10* 
Warmth x Competence -.03 -.01  .01 .01 
  
  
 
Amiability  -.10*      -.28*** -.04   .11** 
Assertiveness      .16***      .21***  .04  -.12** 
Amiability x Assertiveness -.03  -.08* -.05 .05 
 
 
Note. N = 711-716. Variables are the same as those labeled in Tables 1 and 2. The values 
shown represent beta weights results from the simultaneous regression of each index of 
Intellectual Arrogance / Intellectual Humility 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .0001. 
  
Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Contrasting epistemic stances vis-à-vis the world, and their theorized relation with 
intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility  
Figure 2: The circumplex, its orthogonal dimensions, and their predicted empirical relation 
with intellectual arrogance and intellectual humility 
Figure 3: Schematic diagram representing the variables featuring in the within-participants 
regression for Gregg Revised Evaluation of Arguments Task (GREAT), yielding separate 
coefficients designed to capture egotistical bias and rational objectivity respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
